Recent years have seen advances in research and management practice in the area of pricing, and particularly in dynamic pricing and revenue management. At the same time, researchers and managers have made dramatic improvements in production and supply chain management. The interactions between pricing and production/supply chain performance, however, are not as well understood. Can a firm benefit from knowing the status of the supply chain or production facility when making pricing decisions? How much can be gained if pricing decisions explicitly and optimally account for this status? This paper addresses these questions by examining a make-to-order manufacturer that serves two customer classes -core customers who pay a fixed negotiated price and are guaranteed job acceptance, and "fill-in" customers who make job submittal decisions based on the instantaneous price set by the firm for such orders.
INTRODUCTION
1 produces fabricated metal parts mostly for use in the power generation industry. The parts are made from expensive materials -some 4x8-foot sheets of material cost $20,000 -and, not surprisingly, the fabricated parts have very tight tolerances. MetalFab is a large job shop with about 60 highly skilled shop floor employees who operate metal bending and metal cutting machines, as well as a variety of welding equipment. At this writing, approximately 80% of MetalFab's output is sold directly to General Electric, or to first tier GE suppliers. In keeping with MetalFab's policy, we will refer to this output as belonging to GE.
MetalFab can forecast orders from GE and GE's suppliers, but the forecast error can be quite high. Sometimes MetalFab production planners will have firm forecasts -and these forecasts remain firm until the order is delivered. More often, however, GE will change the order quantity and due date several times while the order is outstanding. In fact, GE's systems will occasionally produce a purchase order that is already past due when the order is placed.
(The authors observed a case in which an order placed in September had a due date of the previous May!) Taken together, the blend of firm forecasts, changes, and emergency orders create a situation that is well captured by a mean forecast with a fairly high variance around that mean. Similar situations could arise in cases when a single large customer aggregates demand forecasts from many different locations and provides an aggregate request to its supplier.
From MetalFab's perspective, GE orders form the core of its business, while the other orders that may take up the remaining 20% of its capacity are treated as "fill-in" orders. From a marketing standpoint, one approach to accepting and pricing fill-in orders is to take as many as possible, charge the same price as the core orders, and let the production planners and factory workers try to keep up. The danger with this approach, of course, is that it may not be a long-run profit-maximizing strategy; and service performance, for both GE and fill-ins, could suffer. An alternative approach is to proactively seek fill-in orders when capacity utilization is running low, charging a low price to attract those customers; and when the capacity utilization is high, charging a high price and accepting only limited fill-in orders. This alternative raises the issue of how to (i) price dynamically over time depending on the state of the production system, (ii) endogenously determine "low" versus "high" capacity utilization, and (iii) incorporate core customer arrivals (i.e., orders from core customers) in determining the pricing policy for fill-in We focus attention on four models that take into consideration both core and fill-in customer arrival rates: (1) state-independent (static) pricing -where MetalFab sets a price, p, for fill-in customers without regard to the current state of the factory; (2) allowing fill-in jobs at a chosen price p only when the factory is idle; (3) allowing fill-in jobs at a chosen price p only when there are s or fewer jobs in the production system, where both s and p are decision variables; and (4) general state dependent pricing -i.e. potentially setting a different price for fill-in orders for every possible state of the factory. To ensure satisfactory service, we impose a constraint on expected waiting time for core customers. We compare the optimal solutions obtained in the above four cases, report the magnitude of the benefit from utilizing increasing amounts of information, illustrate interesting properties of the solutions, and examine conditions under which one solution is superior to another.
Before reviewing the relevant literature, it is important to note that this problem is quite general and is generating much interest beyond high precision job shops like MetalFab. With the advent of modern pricing software such as that offered by DemandTec, ProfitLogic, and KhiMetrics, many companies now are devoting considerable time and energy to getting prices right. However, recent trade press articles suggest that firms have traditionally been slow to adopt sophisticated pricing models (Reda 2002) , have priced products solely on cost (At What Price? Guidelines for a Customer-Focused Pricing Strategy 2000) , and often simply employ "what-if" analyses without incorporating the interactions across functional areas (Retail Revenue Management 2001 , Lester 2002 . Further, the transition to the Euro has elevated this issue for companies doing business in Europe, and many are appointing senior "pricing officers" with direct responsibility over pricing decisions. Furthermore, many firms are beginning to realize that price changes should be made with a deeper understanding of the supply chain (Cisco Thought Leadership Summit 2001) . If a firm cuts price to stimulate demand, but the factory or supply chain is currently overloaded, they risk some very unhappy customers. On the other 1 The name of this privately owned company has been disguised at the owner's request.
hand, if the supply chain and factories currently have excess capacity, marketing personnel may wish to decrease price to consume some of that capacity. In addition, some of the leading suppliers of supply chain software are developing linkages to pricing software. Manugistics, for instance, has bought Talus, a revenue management software provider with the expressed intent of linking these two areas. This research is designed to generate insight for managers about the benefits of accounting for the supply chain when making pricing decisions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant literature. In Section 3, we present the four models and corresponding analytical results. A numerical comparison of the policies is presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains a summary discussion and directions for future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The last two decades have seen significant research progress on the interaction of pricing and operations. This literature falls into two fundamental categories: pricing/inventory models and pricing/queuing models. In the first case, generally speaking, prices are determined jointly with inventory decisions, or are determined based on current inventory levels. In the second case, prices are used to control the arrival rate to a queue or queues and may or may not be set based on the current queue length. For a recent review of this literature, see Fleischmann, Hall & Pyke (2004) .
Pricing/inventory models have a long history, beginning with single period, single price, single quantity models like those of Whitin (1955) , Karlin & Carr (1962) , and Lau & Lau (1988) .
Multiperiod models typically assume a single, constant price, and deterministic demand.
Examples include Wagner & Whitin (1958a) , Wagner & Whitin (1958b) , Thomas (1970) , Kunreuther & Richard (1971) , Kunreuther & Schrage (1973) , Pekelman (1974) , Eliashberg & Steinberg (1987) , Eliashberg & Steinberg (1991) , Gilbert (2000) , Arvind Rajan & Steinberg (1992) , and Sogomonian & Tang (1993) .
Models with stochastic demand include Thomas (1974) who addresses an N period problem and proposes a heuristic policy of the form (s, S, p) , where price is a parameter in the probability distribution of demand. Federgruen & Heching (1999) consider a infinite horizon, order-up-to model that has a stationary base stock policy as the optimal policy structure in the case of zero leadtimes. When leadtimes are nonzero, the optimal policy depends on individual order epochs and becomes intractable. However, price is constant and there is no opportunity to change price within period. Chen & Simchi-Levi (2002) consider stationary infinite horizon models with fixed costs and show that the price p in the optimal policy depends on the inventory level. In a seasonal demand model, Biller, Chan, Simchi-Levi, & Swann (2002) and Chan, Simchi-Levi, & Swann (2001) show that, from an inventory perspective, pricing may help meet capacity restrictions by smoothing out demand. Our work differs from this stream of research insofar as we consider a make-to-order system and explicitly model the production system.
In the price/queuing literature, Naor (1969) suggests imposing tolls on new customers to keep queue size in check, where customers have Poisson arrivals and service times are exponential. Upon arrival, customers see the queue length and choose to stay or go.
Balachandran (1972) studies a system in which customers make a payment to purchase a place in the queue. Larger payments buy higher priorities, and customers know the state of the system when they arrive. Customers have delay costs, so they minimize their total cost which includes payment and delay. Adiri & Yechiali (1974) , on the other hand, examine the profit-maximizing price for jobs joining a priority queue where prices vary depending on the priority level of the queue. When a customer arrives, he receives information on the state of the system and then decides whether to join the queue or not. The authors use an iterative process where prices are set first, then customers calculate optimal control limits (i.e., join the queue if the queue length is * n ≤ ), then the firm adjust prices, and so on. Stidham (1985) considers a variation where arrivals are restricted by charging a fee or closing the queue. He considers two cases; in one, the firm is ignorant of the current state of the system, in the other, the firm knows the current state and exercises dynamic flow control. In our paper, we consider a more complex business-to-business environment where the firm under consideration decides at each instant what price to set for a customer order. Further, we examine dynamic pricing in an environment of customer heterogeneity (core customers vs. fill-in customers). Mendelson (1985) considers users of computing resources who have a positive delay cost and explicitly accounts for an externality cost (the delay cost that a user inflicts on all other users) and examines the optimal capacity choice. However, he considers only one static price to keep the queue length regulated. In a similar static setting, Mendelson & Whang (1990) consider internal pricing, i.e., transfer pricing for computer resources, and they address both resource pricing (a price that determines if customers join the system), and priority pricing (set prices based on priorities). Results show that long jobs should be charged more than in proportion to their resource requirements. In their comments on future research, the authors state "it would also be of interest to study a dynamic version of our model, where current queue information is available and is being utilized in setting the resource and priority prices." This is, in part, what we do in this paper. Similarly, Dewan & Mendelson (1990) account for both a delay cost and a capacity cost where users have nonlinear delay cost functions. Customers and service requests are homogeneous. Users also decide to enter the system based on steady state queue lengths rather than on the current queue status, and the price is simply the opportunity cost of servicing that request. Stidham (1992) evaluates a variant of the Dewan and Mendelson model but allows for an upper bound on arrival rate. Customers cannot observe the state of the system on arrival, but a price is charged for admission. So the system designer must choose a service rate and a price (or arrival rate). The new constraint leads to a system in which the first order conditions may not lead to a globally optimal solution (see also Rump & Stidham (1998) and Kim & Mannino (2003) ). Plambeck (2000) , on the other hand, considers two classes of customersdelay sensitive and delay insensitive. Static prices are set for each class, but leadtimes are dynamically quoted. The heuristic policy sets a price and leadtime quote that induces heavy traffic. In this paper, we examine both static and dynamic pricing policies and evaluate the optimal solution analytically and consider a different segmentation of core versus fill-in customer segments.
In the marketing literature, many papers have appeared on dynamic pricing (Baker, Marn, & Zawada (2001) , Hall, Kopalle, & Krishna (2002) , Kopalle, Rao, & Assunção (1996) , Kopalle, Mela, & Marsh (1999) ), but most of that research has been in the area of consumer marketing (Gijsbrechts (1993) ) and less so in the area of business-to-business marketing (Noble & Gruca (1999) ). More importantly, the pricing research in marketing has typically ignored the supply chain implications -for example, Raman & Chatterjee (1995) consider the impact of demand uncertainty on the optimal price path without incorporating the corresponding upstream supply chain implications.
Thus, we propose an analytical, profit maximizing approach for a manufacturer's pricing decisions over time by considering the supply chain impact of dynamic pricing decisions. The proposed model considers customer heterogeneity, stochastic demand, and supply chain (manufacturing capacity) constraints. The decision variables consist of a set of prices offered at different points in time that may be a function of the state of the manufacturing system. The contributions of this paper lie in (1) determining optimal dynamic pricing policies by taking into consideration the key supply chain issue of current congestion levels, and (2) characterizing the conditions under which one policy is superior to another via numerical simulations.
THE MODELS

Modeling Framework
We assume that a firm operating a production system faces two types of demand. The first is demand from "long-term" customers (herein also referred to as core customers) who enter into long-term agreements with the firm by specifying the average quantity required over time at a pre-established price. The second type of customer is a "short-term" / "brand switching" customer (herein also referred to as fill-in customers). These short-term customers approach the firm with immediate needs and will do business with the firm if they find the price and any production delays acceptable. (Seifert, Thonemann, & Hausman (2004) show that a firm can increase profits by procuring a moderate fraction of their demand on the spot market, i.e. as fillin customers to the firm we model.) The production system is operated on a "make-to-order" basis, meaning that the firm does not hold inventory of finished or partly finished goods in advance of customer demand. Such a policy could follow from the economics of the situation (e.g., as in the MetalFab case with expensive finished goods and therefore risky inventory investments) or the characteristics of the products (customized on an order-by-order basis). We assume that both types of demand follow a Poisson arrival process. We denote the average arrival rate of core customers by c λ and the average arrival rate of fill-in customers by f λ .
Given the long-term, contractual agreements between a firm and its core customers, we consider the arrival rates of core customers as given. However, the arrival rate for fill-in customers depends on the prices charged via a downward sloping demand function,
, where f p is the price charged for fill-in customers. We assume that the time required to complete either core or fill-in orders is exponentially distributed with a mean of µ 1 .
We model the above production system as single-server queueing system. Although this framework is a simplification of the serial and parallel arrangement of workstations that exists in most production systems, our abstraction captures the qualitative nature of the congestion and delay that exist in real production systems in an analytically tractable manner. We assume that all jobs are handled on a first-come-first-served basis.
In addition to the revenue collected from customers, we assume that the firm is also concerned with the throughput time of customer orders. We capture this concern via a constraint Mendelson (1985) ). In such a setting, the constraint on expected waiting time is also a constraint on the expected delay cost incurred. In other words, we have 0 W W c ≤ , where c W is the expected wait in the system for core customers and 0 W represents the maximum allowed expected wait for core customers. As in many dynamic settings (Kopalle et al. (1996) ), the firm is interested in maximizing the sum of expected revenue over time. Using a per-period profit criterion (Bertsekas (1987) ), this translates to maximizing average expected revenue collected per unit time. Below we present four models that consider different pricing policies for fill-in customers.
They are:
1. State-independent pricing, which results in a constant price, 2. State-dependent pricing where jobs are admitted only when the system is idle, 3. State-dependent pricing where jobs are accepted up to a certain state and are charged a uniform price, and 4. General state-dependent pricing, in which no constraints are placed on the pricing policy.
Models 1 through 3 consider policies in which constraints are placed on the extent to which state information is utilized in making pricing decisions. These policies were chosen because they represent natural ways in which limited information might be used in practice.
Model 1: State-Independent Pricing
Here we study the case of a firm that sets a uniform price for fill-in jobs independent of the current state of the factory. We do so for benchmarking purposes because such a static policy is simple and requires no real-time information about factory status. It does, however, require information about time-average system behavior, as might be available from historical data. This policy serves as a baseline to compare the performance of our other policies that make use of system state information. State-independent pricing is also consistent with the behavior of core customers whose arrival rate is independent of the system state. This is based on the nature of long-term contracts that often specify a fixed price and a service level commitment, where the supplier manages its production system to satisfy those commitments.
In this context, the problem faced by the supplier is to maximize the expected revenue collected from fill-in customers per unit time, i.e.,
The simple state independent problem outlined above can be modeled as an M/M/1 queue with arrival rate given by
and service rate given by µ . Accordingly, we have (see, e.g., Gross & Harris (1985) ):
We assume The factor ( )
is the reduction in demand for a unit increase in price, and the factor * p is the return earned per unit of demand. Here, the value of a job is simply * p , but we will demonstrate that this factor takes on more complex forms which yield interpretations that can help managers understand both the benefits and costs of taking on additional work.
If the waiting time constraint is binding, the Lagrange multiplier β provides a measure of the cost of the constraint. This cost enters into the calculation of the optimal price in a way that assesses an opportunity cost for each job that is accepted based on its impact on the expected waiting time. In other words, we have,
Note that if there were a variable cost c associated with performing each job and operational complexities were ignored, then the first-order condition for the optimal price would be identical
to (3) Ignoring the operational complexities of this problem would result in choosing a price of $500 per fill-in arrival, resulting in 50 such jobs per month on average. Clearly such a scheme would overwhelm the firm's productive capacity of 10 jobs per month, and we can conclude that the waiting time constraint must be binding. Using the results of Case 2 from Theorem 1, we conclude that the optimal arrival rate is a single fill-in job per month on average at a price of $990. Even though the waiting time constraint is binding, the firm should still accept the occasional, high revenue job. The value of the Lagrange multiplier β is here $980.
Model 2: State-Dependent Pricing -Admitting Jobs When Idle
In this subsection we study, as a first-step towards developing more complex dynamic pricing policies, a simple form of dynamic pricing where fill-in arrivals are allowed only when the system is otherwise idle. This policy captures the idea that a factory manager may wish to only accept fill-in work when the factory is relatively non-congested. Under this policy, the system under study is a Markov chain with departure rate µ in every state and arrival rate c λ in every state except state zero, where the arrival rate is For this policy, the expected waiting time for fill-in customers is just their service time, since they only enter the system when it is idle. The problem faced by the firm in this case is to maximize the expected revenue from fill-in customers per unit time:
subject to:
Note that the firm potentially collects revenue from fill-in customers only when the production system is idle, as captured by the factor 0 π in (4). Theorem 2 below summarizes the solution for problem (3).
Theorem 2. Admit Fill-In Jobs When Idle -Solution.
(a) For problem (4), we have the following two cases:
Case 1: 0 = β and the optimal price 
where Π is the optimal return from the fill-in jobs per unit time. We note that:
The above factor measures the change in the relative odds that the system is in the set of states in which fill-in arrivals are not allowed. Thus, (6) measures the expected lost revenue that results from increasing the arrival rate and its subsequent effect on the steady-state probabilities.
For the case where the waiting time constraint is binding, a second opportunity cost, The chief benefit of this policy is its relative simplicity: managers can easily determine if the factory is idle and communicate that fact to marketing personnel who are evaluating potential fill-in customers.
Model 3: State-Dependent Pricing -Constant Price Up To Cutoff State
Here we study a pricing scheme in which fill-in job arrivals are allowed only if the system is in a relatively uncongested set of states and all fill-in arrivals are charged a uniform price. Such a scheme is simpler to implement in practice than general state-dependent pricing (discussed in the next subsection), since it entails only a check to see if the factory is congested or not, e.g., by examining the number of outstanding orders. If the factory is too busy, the work is turned away. Otherwise, the work is accepted at a standard price for fill-in jobs. This policy here, so the waiting time constraint for core arrivals is also an upper bound on expected waiting time for fill-in jobs. The problem faced by the firm in this case is to maximize the revenue from fill-in customers:
Note that the firm potentially collects revenue from fill-in customers only when the production system is in states 0 through s , as captured by the factor ( ) s F in (7). Theorem 3 summarizes the solution for problem (7).
Theorem 3. Acceptance Up To Cutoff -Solution.
(a) For problem (7), we have the following two cases:
s is infinite, and the optimal price Of note in Theorem 3 is that for a non-binding waiting time constraint, it is optimal to use state-independent pricing for fill-in jobs. From a managerial standpoint, if the factory is very lightly loaded or customers are relatively insensitive to delays, it is best to ignore the state of the factory in deciding which jobs to accept -only price should be used to discourage or encourage customers. 
gives the relative odds that the production system is in a state in which no fill-in arrivals are accepted. The change in these relative odds multiplied by the optimal revenue from fill-in jobs provides a measure of the opportunity cost of accepting another job, i.e., it captures the long-term consequences of the decision. In other words, if the change in relative odds is high when the fill-in arrival rate increases by one unit, then the opportunity cost of accepting a job is high. This implies that the manager should charge a relatively higher price for fill-in jobs in such a setting. A numerical example is presented below. Note that, for the above example, this policy yields a significant improvement in expected profitability over the policy of admitting fill-in jobs only when idle -the gain is approximately 65%! (The gain is 78.5% in comparison to the state-independent pricing policy.) However, this policy is slightly more complicated to implement in practice, for it requires knowledge of the factory state, beyond simply knowing whether the factory is idle. But the gains are remarkable. The typical request from Marketing is to take every job, whereas the response from Manufacturing is often "we are too busy." This example helps determine what "busy" means, and it illustrates the potential gains from optimally choosing the cut-off state and the price jointly.
Model 4: General State-Dependent Pricing
In this subsection we study a general state-dependent pricing scheme in which price may be changed dynamically without constraint, i.e., fill-in job arrivals at time t are charged a price that is a function of the congestion levels in time t. Of course, such a scheme entails tracking the status of the production process carefully so that accurate prices can be specified. We use fi λ to represent the fill-in arrival rate when there are i customers in the system. Lemma 3 below presents the properties for such a queueing system. 
Note that in this setting we are searching for an infinite-dimensional vector of optimal prices.
Theorem 4 below summarizes the solution for problem (8). show that only a finite number of states will exhibit a non-zero arrival rate under linear demand, which simplifies the search for a solution. Under these same conditions, the prices (and arrival rates) will be monotone in the state (see Theorem 5 below). In our experience with numerical examples, we found no instances in which local optima were not global.
Of note in Theorem 4 is that, just as for Theorem 3, if the waiting time constraint is nonbinding, it is optimal to use a single state-independent price for all fill-in jobs. In other words, if customers are not sensitive to delays or if there is significant unused capacity in the factory, a "set and forget" approach is optimal, i.e., a single uniform price is set and factory status is ignored. As a result, implementation is much simpler for lightly loaded systems than for heavily loaded systems.
For the case where the waiting time constraint is binding, we have an infinite series of terms included within the first order conditions that represent the "costs" of an additional arrival.
Not surprisingly, these costs bear a resemblance to similar costs that appear in Theorems 2 and 3.
Each term in this infinite series tabulates the impact of an additional arrival in the state under consideration upon all "larger" states. The first of these terms is:
The expression ( 11) represents the change in the relative odds of occupying state 1 + i due to an increase in the arrival rate in state i . Similar interpretations can be applied to subsequent terms in the series.
Theorem 5 below demonstrates that the set of optimal prices for problem (8) This monotonicity result supports our intuition; as a production system becomes more congested, a higher price should be charged for fill-in jobs because of the greater strain that they put on the system. Using the result of Theorem 5, it is straightforward to show that We know from Example 1 that 0 ≠ β , and thus the waiting time constraint must be binding. Optimization using Excel TM Solver TM yields the results shown in Table 1 below. The progression of prices and arrival rates shown in Table 1 confirms our intuition about these relationships, namely that as the system becomes more congested, a higher price is charged for fill-in arrivals and demand is curtailed. The optimal expected profit per month from fill-in jobs is approximately $1840. It is notable that the improvement relative to the "uniform price up to a cut-off point" policy (from Example 3) is only about 4.1%. This gain comes at the cost of significant additional monitoring of factory status required in order to inform the price choice for this general state-dependent pricing scheme. Without sophisticated tracking software, most managers do not have access to the information required to implement this scheme. It is thus encouraging that the incremental gain is quite small. Figure 1 provides a comparison of the optimal fill-in job arrival rates under each of the four examples discussed in Section 3, plotted with respect to system state, i.e., the number of jobs in queue plus any being served. Clearly the state-independent or static policy yields a conservative approach to fill-in customers; a relatively low arrival rate is maintained to compensate for lack of state information. The policy of admitting fill-in work only when idle yields a contrasting approach. In this example, the waiting time constraint on core jobs is nonbinding, so the constraint of interest is that created by the choice of policy. The result is that a relatively high arrival rate is maintained in the sole state in which we are allowing jobs to be admitted in order that this condition can be exploited. The policy of admitting at a uniform price up to a cut-off state yields, in this example, an intermediate level of arrivals in those states where arrivals are allowed. Lastly, the uniform state-dependent policy yields a set of arrival rates which bracket those of the prior policy, taking better advantage of opportunities when the system is relatively idle and better recognizing the costs of additional arrivals when the system is relatively congested. While the "uniform up to a cut-off" and "general state dependent pricing" policies look quite different from this perspective, it is notable that their relative financial performance is much less divergent. This result was discussed in Section 3 for this particular numerical example and is explored in more depth in this section.
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In the remainder of this section, we expand our set of numerical examples to study policy performance under a broad range of conditions. Expanding on Examples 1-4, we vary two basic model characteristics: (1) the system utilization due to core (long-term) customers, denoted by state-independent pricing. The explanation for this effect is that admitting jobs only when idle gets costly for a lightly loaded system; such a policy does not allow any queueing of fill-in jobs, which can result in unnecessary idle time. Conversely, for heavily loaded systems, admitting jobs only when idle does relatively well compared to a state-independent policy because in such a case it becomes important to account for externality effects, i.e., the impact of an accepted fillin job on the delay of the core jobs.
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Figure 2 also reveals that the relative value of using internal system state information to make job pricing and acceptance decisions increases as c ρ increases. While the relative gains from full state-dependent pricing can be tremendous, the costs of using a policy of uniform pricing up to a cut-off state instead of full state-dependent pricing are much more moderate. Figure 4 plots the relative gain of uniform pricing up to a cut-off vs. a state-independent policy. The curve is very similar to that of Figure 3 for general statedependent pricing. Among the solutions plotted in Figures 3 and 4 , the maximum performance improvement that general state-dependent pricing yields relative to uniform pricing up to a cutoff point is 13.8% at 89 . 0 = c ρ , and the gain is only 3-6% over most of the range of c ρ (the difference in relative performance is not monotone in c ρ , which can be explained by the integer constraint imposed on the cut-off state s ). These gains are quite modest when compared to the value of using internal state information, i.e., the gains from implementing a state-dependent pricing policy vs. a state-independent policy. Figure 5 illustrates the results of a numerical analysis that is identical to that plotted in . For these cases, the waiting time constraint is non-binding and the optimal solution for the policies of uniform pricing up to a cut-off state and general state-dependent pricing both collapse to the state-independent pricing solution, as described in Theorems 3 and 4. As c ρ increases, the waiting time constraint becomes binding and these two state-dependent policies begin to differ from and outperform state-independent pricing. Figure 6 presents the relative gains from general state dependent pricing vs. stateindependent pricing, and Figure 7 presents the relative gains from uniform pricing up to a cut-off state vs. state-independent pricing. These plots are analogues of Figures 3 and 4 for the small market case. Figure 6 reveals that the relative value of state information increases dramatically as the system becomes more congested. Figure 7 again supports the idea that the relative gains from full-state dependent pricing vs. uniform pricing up to a cutoff are limited -here the maximum gain is 6.9% at 88 . 0 = c ρ .
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Although our numerical analysis cannot serve as proof of any normative statements regarding these four policies, they do provide some important insights. In all cases, a policy of uniform pricing up to a cut-off state performs quite well versus full state-dependent pricing. This is particularly noteworthy for a number of reasons: (1) it requires less detailed information about the state of the system, i.e., management only needs to know whether the factory is "too busy to accept fill-in work" or not; (2) the uniform pricing policy is much easier to compute and communicate to relevant managers; and (3) a uniform pricing policy is less likely to cause dissonance among customers who experience widely varying prices that result from a process over which they have no control. Another observation that follows from our analysis is that the relative value of using information about factory status increases dramatically as the factory becomes more congested. This result is not surprising, but the relative magnitude of the effect can be huge, ranging up to 812% as noted above.
An analytic result that lends some support to the numerical results of this section is provided via the concept of entropy from the field of information theory. Entropy is a measure of uncertainty in a probabilistic system, i.e., it is a measure of the complexity required to describe a random variable, and serves as an indicator of the minimum complexity of the system required to produce instances of a given random variable. (See, for example, Cover and Thomas (1991) for a discussion of entropy). Entropy is formally defined for a positive, discrete random variable as:
where the result is measured in "bits" when the logarithm is taken as base 2, as here. It is well known that the steady-state state distribution for the M/M/1 queue follows a geometric distribution (see, for example, Gross & Harris (1985) ). This result can be used to calculate the entropy associated with the state distribution for an M/M/1 queue:
where ρ is the system utilization. When
In other words, if the system is always idle, there is no uncertainty in its state. Figure 8 plots the system state entropy as a function of system utilization. Clearly, system entropy increases in system utilization. Therefore, more information is revealed from observing the state of a highly utilized system than would be revealed by observing a less highly utilized production system. Hence, there is substantive information revealed when observing the system state when the utilization is high. This is precisely the reason why we observe increasing relative gains with state-dependent pricing versus a stateindependent pricing as core customer utilization increases (see Figures 3, 4, 6 and 7) . The shape of the curve in Figure 8 closely resembles that of Figures 3, 4, 6 , and 7, all of which measure the impact of state knowledge in terms of relative financial return (and which reflect queueing systems that depart somewhat from the assumptions of an M/M/1 system). Figure 8 reveals that there is an underlying concept of the information content of state information that closely parallels the value of that information revealed in our numerical examples. This analytic result also provides some assurance that the results of our set of numerical examples are somewhat general in nature.
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The interpretation of entropy as a measure of the complexity of the system required to generate a random variable can also provide some insights into the performance of the four pricing policies considered in this paper (see, for example, Cover and Thomas (1991) for an explanation of Kolmogorov complexity). Each of these policies (except static pricing as in Model 1) requires a signal from the factory floor in order to establish the current price for fill-in work. The entropy associated with these signals is a measure of the minimum complexity of the systems required to generate these signals, which should correlate with the relative difficulty of implementing such a system on the factory floor.
We can revisit the examples of Section 3 and use this notion of complexity to evaluate the performance/complexity tradeoff for the policies we consider. In the examples of Section 3, state-independent pricing requires no information about factory status to quote a price.
Admitting only when idle requires 0.329 bits of information per factory status inquiry on average, uniform price up to a cutoff state requires 0.880 bits, and general state-dependent pricing requires 4.172 bits. (These figures can be calculated from the state probabilities that are relevant to the decision; in the case of admitting only when idle, we need only be concerned with the states "idle" and "busy," which are occupied with probabilities 0.060 and 0.940, respectively.) These entropy values can be used to calculate a "return per bit" from each of the three dynamic policies. Table 2 summarizes the results of this calculation for the examples of Section 3. Here again, we see evidence that the policy of uniform pricing up to a cutoff state deserves attention: it far outperforms the other policies on this metric. We've demonstrated previously that this policy performs nearly as well as general state-dependent pricing in a variety of numerical studies. Here see that this performance is coupled with a relatively low measure of policy complexity, indicating that policy is likely to be relatively easy to implement.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, although there has been much research in the area of dynamic pricing, very few papers have integrated supply chain issues with pricing policies. This paper contributes to the literature that attempts to fill this gap. Second, the papers that do integrate supply chain issues with pricing policies generally focus on inventory levels.
Little is known, however, with respect to how pricing policies and the supply chain dynamically interact in make-to-order scenarios. Our work sheds some light on these issues. In particular, we combine the study of two types of customers in a natural way. Long-term, or core, customers face state-independent pricing and a constraint on expected order delay, consistent with typical long-term contractual arrangements. Much more flexibility is generally allowed in choosing pricing policies for short-term, or fill-in, customers, and this choice forms the core of this paper.
We introduced four models of the interaction of pricing and the factory status for fill-in customers, including (1) ignoring queue length and setting a single, constant price for fill-ins, (2) admitting fill-ins only when the system is idle and setting a price accordingly, (3) admitting fillins up to a system state of s under a uniform price, and (4) setting a different price for each possible state of the system. Models 1 through 3 considered policies in which constraints are placed on the extent to which state information is utilized in making pricing decisions. We find the optimal prices analytically for each model, and for model (3) we also find the optimal cut-off state, * s . We also analytically illustrate insights and properties common to the four models, taking into consideration (a) the waiting time constraint for the core customers and (b) the opportunity cost of taking up an additional fill-in order. Finally, we illustrate the behavior of the models using numerical analyses, which highlight new insights.
Clearly, the policy that requires the least information from production is stateindependent pricing. One would expect, therefore, that any policy which employs some information about queue status would show higher profitability. This is not necessarily true, however. For instance, a policy that admits fill-ins only when the system is idle can perform much worse than state-independent pricing when system utilization is relatively low. In other words, using only information about the factory being idle can actually be worse than using no factory status information at all.
Perhaps the most striking, and encouraging, result is that a policy that admits fill-in customers at a constant price up to a cut-off state of s , where both s and price are set optimally, can dramatically outperform a state-independent policy -yielding an almost 80% gain in the example of Section 3. Using queue information in this case is likely well worth the effort.
Further, the increase in profit achievable from setting a different optimal price for each possible state of the production system, relative to the policy of a uniform price up to a cut-off state, is fairly small -about 4% in the same example cited above. This result suggests that while managers can improve profit markedly by using information about the status of the factory, a fairly simple pricing policy that requires limited information gathering can perform extremely well. Our results on policy complexity in Section 5 provide evidence that the policy of uniform pricing up to a cutoff state is superior according to a performance/complexity ratio measure.
The general state-dependent pricing strategy, where the price for a fill-in order arriving at time t is dependent on the state of the system at time t , is the most dynamic of the four policies we consider. Given the stochastic arrivals of core and fill-in customers, none of the customer groups can ex-ante predict what the state of the system will be. Although there may be some concern that such a dynamic pricing policy may turn away potential customers, we argue that existence of such fully state-dependent pricing policies may actually motivate some fill-in customers to become core customers. A parallel picture in the grocery industry is the emergence of loyalty cards where "loyal" (or long-term) customers are promised better deals than "walk-in" customers who have to pay the price they face during that week. In fact, it appears that supermarket chains are thus effectively competing with big discounters such as WalMart via using such customer loyalty programs and thus increasing their overall profitability (Patton 2002 ).
This research presents many opportunities for future work. For example, one could endogenize the price charged to core customers and optimally select both that price and fill-in prices. Furthermore, future research could endogenize the waiting time constraint as well.
Additional future research could examine the impact of strategic competition on the pricing and waiting time policies for core and fill-in customers. Another opportunity exists in estimating actual demand functions for core and fill-in customers in a business-to-business setting and developing the corresponding optimal policies. Such an analysis would be more amenable to comparative statics as well. It is our hope that this research stimulates further interest in the integration of pricing and supply chain performance. 
APPENDIX -PROOFS
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Entropy (bits)
